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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LY~K '''· )!.A.RTIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 7731 
PAl1L H. STEVENS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of s.eptember 25, 1950, at about 7 :00 
A.M. plaintiff was driving south on 18th East in his auto-
mobile. It was a clear morning; the streets were dry. 
As he travelled south on 18th East he approached the 
intersection of 18th East and Stratford Avenue. Upon 
approaching this intersection he slowed down. Looking 
to the east is a "blind intersection;" to the west it is 
open. Plaintiff looked to the west first; as he got closer 
to the corner he looked to the east and saw that it was 
clear and then proceeded into the intersection. As he 
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proceeded into the intersection, he turned his head back 
to the right to check again. At that time he heard the 
brakes or the tires. squealing on the defendant's automo-
bile. Plaintiff looked back to the left and saw that de-
fendant's car was setting up a skid that was carrying 
defendant's car right into the side of plaintiff's car. 
Plaintiff jammed on his brakes and stopped, hoping de-
fendant would not hit him squarely in the door by which 
he was sitting. R. 19, 20, 34, 38. 
Plaintiff's automobile came to a stop a little beyond 
the center of the intersection, i.e., to the south. The left 
front fender and wheel of defendant's automobile struck 
plaintiff's car at the front post of the left front door. R. 
21. 
The impact of defendant's automobile colliding 
against plaintiff's rendered plaintiff unconscious. Plain-
tiff's automobile, by reason of the impact, was knocked 
west on Stratford Avenue up over two front yards and 
a hedge. Plaintiff's automobile came to rest on the park-
ing a distance of 156 feet from the point of impact. R. 
21, 83. Defendant's automobile came to a rest at a point 
about 18 feet in a southerly direction from the point of 
impact. 
Plaintiff first observed defendant's automobile when 
it was about 60 feet up the street. R. 22. There were no 
traffic signs or controls at the intersection. 
The northeast corner of 18th East and Stratford 
Avenue is built up quite a bit higher than the road. 
There is a fence with vines growing over it extending 
from the house almost to the sidewalk on Stratford Ave-
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nue. The fence then runs east son1e 42 feet, then north 
encompassing the lot. 
There are trees gro,ving along the east parking of 
18th East as you approach the intersection. The north 
parking of Stratford Avenue is also planted with trees. 
Between the fence and sidewalk shrubs were growing. 
There is a large "\veeping "\villow tree which covers most 
of the west lawn. The trees which are growing in the 
parking areas haYe branches close to the grounds and 
were thick with foliage. The trunks of these trees were 
about six inches in diameter. R. 23, 41, 44. 
Plaintiff testified that as he approached the inter-
section he knew it was blind to the east. He looked first 
to the west and than as he got fairly close to the intersec-
tion, he looked to the east. At that time he could see 
approximately 150 to 200 feet eastward up Stratford 
Avenue. There were no cars visible at that time. 
There were four solid lines of skid marks made by 
the tires of defendant's automobile extending east from 
the point of impact a distance of 57 to 65 feet. R. 34, 83. 
Plaintiff, in stopping his automobile, left skid marks 
of approximately two feet in length. R. 34. 18th East 
Street and Stratford Avenue are. asphalt covered streets. 
R. 46. There is a survey monument located in the center 
of the intersection. From this monument to the north-
ernmost tire mark of defendant's automobile it was a 
distance of 22 inches. R. 36. 
As one app-roaches Stratford Avenue when driving 
south on 18th East, the view to the east on Stratford 
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Avenue is obstructed by a high fence, vines, bushes, trees, 
etc., so that the. front portion of the automobile would be 
halfway through the intersection before a clear view 
of Stratford Avenue could be gained. R. 44, 45. 
It was stipulated that the asphalt surface of 18th 
East Street was 25.75 feet wide; that the asphalt sur-
face of Stratford Avenue was 28 feet wide. See Exhibit 
C., R. 46. 
Plaintiff's car, after the collision, had a salvage 
value of $155.55. R. 53. 
Stratford Avenue, running east from the intersec-
tion, rises in an average grade of 3~%. R. 71. The top 
of the fence running around the corner lot is about 7 
feet above the asphalt surface of 18th East Street. The 
eye level on the average automobile is about 5¥2 feet, so 
that it is not possible to see over the fence while driving 
along in an automobile. R. 72. 
Exhibit D, which was admitted in evidence, shows 
the various distances of visibility eastward up Stratford 
Avenue as a motorist approaches Stratford Avenue 
travelling south on 18th East Street. F·or example, when 
30 feet from the corner, there is a possibility of seeing 
some 105 feet east; 20 feet from the corner 205 feet; 
15 feet from the corner 465 feet. However, as was testi-
fied to by Witness Rogers, there is quite a bit of shrub-
bery and trees that temporarily block out the line of 
vision or obstruct it entirely and a good field of vision 
is not available. R. 73. These distances would also vary 
depending on whether the car coming down Stratford 
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Avenue "'"as nearer the nortl1 side of the road or the 
south side. R. 76. Conversely, a motorist driving west 
on Stratford .. A.venue 'vould have the same difficulties 
in ascertaining the traffic coming into the intersection 
from the north. 
Officer Peterson testified that defendant stated that 
he was going west on St!atford Avenue, saw plaintiff's 
car approaching the intersection, put on his brakes, but 
was unable to stop prior to hitting plaintiff. R. 84. 
Officer Farnsworth testified that if defendant's 
automobile had come to a complete stop·, leaving 57 feet 
of brake marks on the dry asphalt surface, defendant 
would have been travelling 32 miles per hour or more. 
This is assuming that the brakes of defendant's car were 
in good condition. R. 88. Officer Farnsworth also testi-
fied that if defendant's automobile did not come to a com-
plete stop within that 57 feet, which it obviously did not, 
the speed of defendant's automobile would naturally be 
higher. R. 89. 
According to Salt Lake City Ordinance number 6138, 
the maximum speed limit on Stratford Avenue is 25 miles 
per hour. 
At the close of plaintiff's case, a discussion concern-
ing a question of law was had in the judge's chambers 
and upon returning to the courtroom, the defendant 
made the following motion. (R. 90, 91): 
"Comes now the defendant and moves that the jury 
be directed to return a verdict in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff on the plaintiff's complaint, 
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no cause of action, for the following grounds and rea-
sons: 
"1. There is no evidence in the record of any negli-
gence upon the part of the defendant. 
"2. There is no evidence that any negligence on 
the part of the defendant was the cause of the accident 
and the injuries, if any, sustained by the plaintiff. 
"3. The plaintiff's own testimony and the testimony 
of the other witnesses offered by the plaintiff shows con-
clusively that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negli-
gence which was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
"4. The plaintiff's testimony and the other evidence 
adduced on behalf of the plaintiff show the plaintiff to 
have been guilty of contributory negligence which was 
a substantial proximate cause of the accident." 
Defendant's motion was granted by the court. R. 91. 
S.TATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION THAT THE JURY BE DIRECTED TO RETURN A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
(a) WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR 
THE JURY TO DECIDE AND CANNOT BE DECIDED BY 
THE COURT AS A MATTER. OF LAW. 
(b) ASSUMING PLAINTIFF WAS IN SOME MANNER 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Defendant's motion, which was granted by the court~ 
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sets forth four grounds. Ho\veYer, it is obvious that the 
fourth ground \vas the one upon ,,·hich the court based its 
decision in this n1a tter, thn t is, vvhether plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and 
\Yhich negligence was a substantial legal cause of the 
accident. There can be no question but that defendant 
himself was guilty of negligence which was the substan-
tial legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
(a) WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR 
THE JURY TO DECIDE AND CANNOT BE DECIDED BY 
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Even though this case was not tried in the District 
Court by the present attorneys on appeal, it is apparent 
that the trial judge in ruling upon the defendant's motion 
was persuaded that the doctrine in the cases of Hickok 
v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514, March 5, 1948, 
and c·onklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437, May 
11, 1948, should be applied to this case. It is the write-r's 
contention that the facts of this case do not come within 
the doctrine as expressed in these cases and that under · 
no circumstances should that doctrine be extended to in-
clude a case of this type. Plaintiff's argument is, that 
whether he was guilty of contributory negligence, which 
was a substantial and legal cause of the collision in ques-
tion, should have been submitted to the jury for their 
sole determination. 
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Plaintiff, upon approaching Stratford Avenue on the 
morning of the collision, looked first to the right and 
then, as he drew closer to the intersection, looked to 
the left and could see approximately 150 to 200 feet east 
up Stratford Avenue. Seeing that no cars were in view, 
plaintiff then proceeded into the intersection, at the same 
time turning his head back to the right to ascertain if 
any cars were coming from that direction. At this point, 
plaintiff heard the screeching of brakes and looking back 
to the left, he saw defendant's automobile setting up a 
skid some 60 feet to the east. Plaintiff jammed on his 
brakes and stopped. Defendant, unable to stop his auto-
mobile, skidded for some sixty feet into the side of plain-
tiff's automobile. The exact point of the collision was a 
little beyond the center of the intersection. From the 
survey monument located in the center of the inter-
section to the northernmost tire mark of defendant's · 
auto, was a distance of 2·2 inches, which would place de-
fendant's automobile substantially over the center line 
of Stratford Avenue. On the basis of these facts, it is 
impossible to understand how the trial court could hold 
as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, and that such negligence was a sub-
stantial legal cause of the accident. 
Generally sp·eaking, a motorist proceeding to a point 
near an intersection from which he can see a sufficient 
distance to ascertain that anyone coming from beyond, 
at any lawful speed, will not interfere with his safe 
crossing, may rightfully proceed. There cannot be thrust 
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upon the plaintiff the duty to foresee and avoid the negli-
gence of the defendant, "'"ho obviously proceeded down 
Stratford _.A .. venue at an tmla.,Yful rate of speed, oblivious 
to the fact that he could not see cars approaching from 
the north into the intersection of 18th East and Stratford 
Avenue, and unlawfully demanding that automobiles ap-
proaching from his right yield the right of way to him 
regardless of their position in the intersection. Having 
once made a reasonable observation as to the traffic on 
Stratford A venue, plaintiff is not negligent because he 
does not again look for approaching vehicles before mak-
ing the crossing. 
Plaintiff testified that when he looked to the· east 
he could see approximately 150 to 200 feet up Stratford 
Avenue. For example, according to Exhibits c. and D, 
if plaintiff were 20 feet back from the corner he could 
see approximately 205 feet eastward up Stratford Ave-
nue. Accordingly, plaintiff would then he some 46 feet 
from the exact center of the intersection. Plaintiff testi-
fied that he was traveling 10 or 15 miles per hour as he 
approached the intersection. At this speed plaintiff would 
traverse that distance in some 2 or 3 seconds. Assuming 
defendant were just beyond the 205 ft mark on Stratford 
Avenue, defendant would then be about 214 feet from the 
exact center of the intersection. Accordingly defendant 
would be traveling between 45 to 55 miles per hour in 
order to meet plaintiff at the exact center of the inter-
section. Certainly it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
defendant was traveling at such a rate of speed and 
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the jury could find such to be true. Where, under such 
a state of facts, can it be said that plaintiff neglected his 
duty in any way or failed to act as a reasonably prudent 
man would act under similar circumstances~ 
c·ertainly there cannot be thrust upon plaintiff the 
necessity of guarding against the unlawful speed which 
defendant must have been travelling down Stratford 
Avenue. It should be noted that the officer testified that 
from the 57 feet of black skid marks burned into the 
asphalt surface, he estimated the defendant would have 
been travelling 32 miles an hour, or more, if defendant 
had stopped at the end of the 57 feet. However, since 
the defendant smashed into the side of plaintiff's auto-
mobile, knocking it through two front yards and a hedge, 
a distance of approximately 156 feet, it is apparent that 
defendant was travelling considerably faster than 32 
miles per hour. It certainly is not necessary that plain-
tiff be able to see as far as his eye can reach before pro-
ceeding into the intersection. His duty is performed if ne 
can see sufficiently far to discover whether there is 
traffic approaching from that direction within a distance 
traversible by a vehicle driven at a lawful speed. This is 
not a case of plaintiff looking and not seeing what was 
obviously there, and it is only reasonable under the facts 
and evidence to assume that when plaintiff did look and 
saw no vehicles approaching, and could see approximate-
ly 150 to 200 feet, that. defendant was then further east 
on Stratford Avenue travelling at an unlawful rate of 
speed. Whether the failure to observe was negligence 
must be determined by a jury considering all the factors 
10 
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involved, as to the situation at the crossing and of the 
respective drivers at and immediately prior to the colli-
SlOD. 
It cannot be said in this case that the facts are such 
that reasonable men could not, but conclude, that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent. Plaintiff, in approach-
ing the intersection of Stratford Avenue and 18th East, 
exercised the reasonable care that an ordinary prudent 
man would exercise to avoid injuring or being injured by 
other vehicles, in doing such, performed his duty required 
under the law. For a discussion involving these various 
principles, see Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile 
Law & Practice, Permanent Edition, Volume II, Sections 
1037, 1038 at pages 223 to 234. 
It would be a waste of time to cite cases from other 
jurisdictions as this court has already promulgated de-
cisions which deal with this specific point. 
At the risk of boring this court with numerous cita-
tions from its own decisions, plaintiff desires to makH a 
review of the various cases dealing with this point. 
In the case of BULLOCK v. LUKE, 98 Utah 501, 
506, 507, 510, 511, 98 P. 2d 350, 352, 354, this court held 
that a motorist approaching an intersection at a speed 
of 25 miles per hour, who failed to observe a truck on 
his left until he was within 20 feet of the intersection 
although his view was unobstructed for a distance from 
200 to 800 feet, varying inversely with his proximity to 
the intersection, was contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law for failing to observe the truck sooner and for in-
11 
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sisting on his right of way after it was apparent that 
the truck driver was not going to yield the right of way. 
At page 352 of Pacific Reports the court states: 
"Thus, under ordinary circumstances, where 
Bullock and Luke approached and entered the 
intersection, if Bullock had the right of way, it 
presupposes that he saw Luke approaching. If 
Bullock did not see Luke under circumstances 
where he should have seen him, he was careless, 
and, if as a result of such carelessness, either 
alone or in conjunction with carelessness on the 
part of Luke·, a coJlision between them occurred, 
then it does not lie in the mouth of Bullock to 
assert that he assumed Luke would give him that 
right. His own carelessness is inconsistent with 
such an assumption. This principle, we believe, 
is decisive of the· facts of this case under Bullock's 
testimony that he did not see Luke until he, Bul-
lock, was some 20 feet south of the point of im-
pact, 5 feet short of the distance within which he 
could have stopped at the rate of speed he was 
travelling." 
At page 352 Pacific Reports this court quotes from 
Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile Law and Prac-
tice, Volume II, permanent edition, page 203, par. 1038: 
"There is no arbitrary rule as to the time and 
place of looking for vehicles on an intersecting 
· road, and no particular distance from the inter-
section is prescribed for that purpose. The gene-
ral standards are that observation should be made 
at the first opportunity and at a point where the 
observation will be reasonably efficient for, and 
conduce to, protection." 
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion, states at page 
12 
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354 of Pacific Reports : 
''* * * ''Thile one n1ust exercise that degree 
of rare "\Yhich the situation dictates, even though 
the situation has a negligent factor in it created 
by another, "\Ye n1ust be careful not to stretch con-
tributory negligence to the p·oint "\vhere we make it 
inctnnbent upon one not only to drive carefully, 
but to driYe so carefully as always to be pTepared 
for some sudden burst of negligence of another 
and be able to avoid it .. * * * The duty of A to 
avoid the negligence of B should only begin where 
that negligence was or should have been timely ap-
parent to A, and apparent that it would in al.l 
probability continue, and A then failed to use 
such care as a prudent man would have used in 
like circumstances to avoid it. * * *" 
Is it possible for the trial court to say that the in-
stant case falls within the category of Bullock v. Luke~ 
How could plaintiff have failed to maintain a proper 
lookout under facts as presented in the record~ Cer-
tainly the Bullock case would not so hold. Plaintiff Mar-
tin was not alerted to the negligence of defendant nor 
would any reasonable person have been alerted to such 
danger. 
In the case of HICKOK V. SKINNER, 113 Utah 
1, 7, 11, 190 P. 2d 514, 517, 518, 519 where plaintiff, having 
seen defendant's automobile app·roaching the inter-
section on a through highway 400 to 500 feet away, 
started his automobile forward from a point 20 feet back 
from the intersection and drove almost across the high-
way without again looking in the direction from which 
defendant's auto was approaching, plaintiff was held con-
13 
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tributorily negligent, precluding a recovery, notwith-
standing that defendant should have yielded the right 
of way. 
The court states in this case at page 517 of Pacific 
Reports: 
"While the facts in the case of Bullock v. 
Luke * * * are dissimilar, one of the rules laid 
down by that case is applicable here, and that is, 
regardless of which driver is technically entitled 
to the right of way, both operators must use due 
care and caution in proceeding into and across 
intersections. While the burden to drive so care-
fully as always to be prepared for, and to be able 
to avoid, the negligence of another, should not be 
placed upon either driver, there should be placed 
upon both the burden to keep a proper lookout 
and to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. 
* * *" 
Justice Wolfe, in his dissent, states at pages 518 and 
519 of Pacific Reports : 
"Where an intersection is controlled by a 
semaphore, the rights of various streams of traf-
fic to proceed and the duties of other streams of 
traffic to halt are clearly indicated by the various 
colored lights of the signal, little or nothing is 
left to human judgment. But where an intersec-
tion is controlled only by stop signs, or is un-
controlled, the rights of drivers to proceed and 
their duties to halt are, to a large extent, deter-
mined by human judgment. * * * And since the 
relative rights and duties of drivers approaching 
an intersection such as this depend to a large ex-
tent upon the exercise of human judgment, I am 
inclined to the opinion that the question of 
whether or not the judgment exercised by the 
14 
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driYers 'Yas reasonable is a question of fact for 
the jury." 
In the Hickok rase, plaintiff was aware of the ap-
proach of defendant toward the intersection, but dis-
regarded this factor and drove across the highway with-
out giving heed to the warning. Plaintiff Martin could 
not foresee that defendant would burst into view travel-
ing at an unlawful rate of speed. Plaintiff had the right 
to assume, until given warning to the contrary, that de-
fendant would approach at a lawful speed. 
In the case of CONKLIN V. WALSH, 113 Utah 276, 
280, 193 P. 2d 437, 439, a truck driver who, while driving 
a truck on an arterial highway at a speed of 30 to 45 
miles per hour, observed an auto approaching from the 
left into an intersecting street at 10 or 15 miles per hour 
while the truck was a quarter of a block from the inter-
section. The truck driver looked to the right and failed 
until too late to avoid the collision to observe that the 
motorist, after stopping, was attempting to drive across 
the arterial highway. The truck driver was held guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law. 
The court states at page 439 Pacific Reports : 
"* * * By his own admission the truck driver 
travelled at least one quarter of a block without 
making any further observance of a car which, 
at the time he first saw it, was much nearer the 
intersection than was his* * *" 
Here again in the Conklin case, plaintiff was aware 
of defendant's approach into the intersection and yet dis-
regarded it. Such fact is not present in the instant case. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of HUNTER V. MICHAELS, ______ Utah 
------, 198 P. 2d 245, Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion 
states at page 253 of Pacific Reports: 
"I agree, however, with the Chief Justice that 
under the California law it is not negligence in law 
for a person to cross the street at any place other 
than at a crosswalk. I am also in accord with the 
view that it is a jury question as to whether the 
plaintiff exercised due care in keeping a lookout 
while she was crossing the street, and whether she 
gave sufficient rea.ppra.isals of the traffic ap-
proaching from the west as she was proceeding 
across. That is what I contended for in Hickok 
v. Skinner* * *" 
c:an this court say as a matter of law that plaintiff 
failed to appraise the situation as he approached the in-
tersection of Stratford Avenue and 18th East Street~ 
This is a question for the jury to decide, not the court. 
In MINGUS V. OLS.SON, et al, ______ Utah ______ , 205 
P. 2d 495, 498, the evidence established that as a matter 
of law the pedestrian was contributorily negligent in 
attempting to cross a street on a crosswalk, either be-
cause he failed to lo9k, or having looked, he failed to 
see what he should have seen. 
Justice Wolfe states in the majority opinion, page 
498, Pacific Reports: 
·"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian who 
undertakes to cross a busy street of a large city, 
·without first observing for vehicular traffic, is 
guilty of contributory negligence. And this is true 
even though he may be crossing in a crosswalk and 
have the right of way. In the recent case of Hickok 
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v. Skinner * * * this court held that a motorist 
who had the right of 'vay arross an intersection, 
nevertheless had the duty to observe for traffic 
as he proceeded across the intersection. The 
rights of pedestrians to the use of the public 
streets are the same as those of motorists -
neither greater nor less. Hence the same general 
duties devolve upon them. A p·edestrian crossing 
a public street in a crosswalk or pedestrian lane, 
although he may have the right of way over ve-
hicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to ob-
serve for such traffic. Clearly decedent neglected 
that duty in this case. It follows that he was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of course, 
we do not mean to imply that a mere glance in that 
direction of· the .approaching automobile would 
suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it the 
duty to see what is there to be seen and to pay 
heed to it." 
There is no question but that plaintiff had the right 
of way in the instant case. He ap;praised the situation 
before traveling through the intersection, and whether 
or not defendant was there to be seen, in view of all 
the facts, was a question for the jury to decide and not 
the court. 
In the case of NIELSON V. MAUC.HLEY, ______ Utah 
------, 202 P. 2d 547, 549, the evidence was that plaintiff, 
while driving his automobile on an icy road at 25 miles 
per hour, saw defendant backing a school bus out of his 
yard. Plaintiff was then 300 feet away. He reduced his 
speed to 20 miles per hour at 243 feet and continued at 
that speed until 115 feet from the driveway, when he 
applied his brakes to avoid colliding with the school bus 
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which defendant had backed clear across the road. Plain-
tiff was not held guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. Justice Wade in that opinion, page 549 
of Pacific Reports, states: 
"In holding that the court erred in finding 
as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence, we do not wish it under-
stood that the jury could not have so found. 
Whether or not plaintiff acted as a reasonably 
prudent man under the circumstances is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine. The mere 
fact that plaintiff had the right of way would not 
give him the right to proceed without regard to 
existing conditions. He 1nust exercise due care 
and act as a reasonably prudent man would act 
under the existing circumstances. S.ee Bullock v. 
Luke .. Hickok v. Skinner .. Conklin v. Walsh .. 
and McDougall v. Morrison, 55 Cal. App. 2d 92, 
130 Fd 149, on page 151 wherein it is stated: 
" 'Each case must turn upon its own facts. 
Contributory negligence, as a matter of law, can 
only be found where reasonably prudent minds 
cannot but conclude that a reqsonable careful and 
prudent person, situated as was plaintiff, would 
not have acted as he did. The situations where 
a court will so declare are rare. * * *' " 
Without intending to raise additional issues in the 
case, it appears to the writer that the court, through 
Justice Wade, may be· abrogating the e·arlier rule laid 
down in Hickok v. Skinner, etc., but regardless of this, 
whether Plaintiff Martin acted with due care in ap-
proaching the intersection was a question for the jury. 
In the case of GREN V. NORTON, ______ Utah ______ , 213 
P. 2d 356, this court, speaking through Justice Latimer, 
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held that 'vhere a n1otorist had an unobstructed view to 
the north of the intersection for about one mile, he was 
charged 'vith an a'vareness of defendant's large trailer-
truck approaching from the north, and plaintiff was held 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing 
to maintain a proper lookout. 
Here again is the doctrine that plaintiff must see 
what is there to be seen where there are no obstructions, 
or restrictions in the field of vision. Plaintiff is charged 
with the duty of acting as a reasonably prudent man to 
avoid foreseeable negligence. Plaintiff Martin cannot be 
charged with knowing that defendant would suddenly 
burst into view at an unlawful rate of speed. 
In the case of SPACKMAN V. CARSON, ______ Utah 
______ , 216 P. 2d 640, 643, an action by a motorcyclist for 
damages from collision with a truck which, when the 
motorcyclist first observed it, was about 200 feet away, 
parked off the paved portion of the highway in front of 
a dwelling, and when he next observed it was about 30 
feet away on the pavement. Whether or not the motor-
cyclist was .negligent in the matter of lookout was for the 
jury to determine. The court stated at page 643, Pacific 
Reports: 
"But according to plaintiff's testimony, when 
he first observed the truck it was standing motion-
less in front of a dwelling and there was no indi~ 
cation whatever that it was about to be moved on-
to the pavement. The plaintiff was not alerted 
to any immediate danger. Under these circum-
stances we are convinc-ed that the issue of whether 
the plaintiff was negligent in failing to keep a 
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more diligent lookout ahead was properly sub-
mitted to the jury." 
In the case of MARTIN V. SHEFFIELD, 112 Utah 
478, 484, 485, 189 P. 2d 127, 130 the plaintiff was driving 
west on Wilson Avenue approaching lOth East Street. 
The defendant was driving north on lOth East toward 
Wilson Avenue. Plaintiff was proceeding at a speed 
of about 20-25 miles per hour at the time of the collision. 
When the plaintiff was 50 feet east of the intersection, 
she could see south of the . intersection about 75 feet. 
Looking to the south she saw no car and she did not look 
again to the south until she. saw defendant's car so close 
that the impact was about to occur. In this case there 
were skid marks from 36-51 feet made by defendant's 
car. Defendant stated he started to apply his brakes 
approximately 60 feet south of the intersection. This 
court stated at page 130, Pacific Reports : 
"Is the evidence of plaintiff's conduct in the 
operation of her husband's car such that reason-
able minds must conclude that she was guilty of 
contributory negligence, so that she was precluded 
as a matter of law from reco~ering any judgment 
for pe-rsonal injuries~ There was some evidence 
in this case that plaintiff failed to keep a proper 
lookout and that she failed to look to the left as 
she entered the intersection, and that she was 
travelling at an excessive rate of speed, from 
which evidence the jury might have found negli-
gence on her part which contributed to the acci-
dent. The only evidence as to her failure to keep 
a proper lookout which is undisputed, is her testi-
mony that she looked to the left when she was 
50 feet from the intersection and that she saw no 
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car and that she looked to her right and did not 
look to her left again until she was in the inter-
section and sa"r defendant's car to her left as it 
'vas about to crash into the left side of her car. 
There. was a conflict in the evidence as to her 
speed, as to the defendant's speed, and as to 
whetheT the defendant stopped before the colli-
sion or stopped after the. impact with plaintiff's 
car. These factors would all have some bearing on 
whether the failure of plaintiff to look to her left 
the instant she entered the inte.rsection contribu-
ted to the accident or prevented her from stopping 
her car short of the point of impact, or prevented 
her from turning to the. right to avoid the colli-
sion." (Italics supplied). 
"Inasmuch as the conclusion whether or not 
she was negligent must depend upon those dis-
puted factors, which constitute the premises for 
such conclusions, if those premises are jury ques-
tions, then they must first be determined before 
a proper conclusion can be drawn from them. If 
reasonable minds might differ as to which ver-
sion of events shall be believed, then reasonable 
minds might likewise differ as to whether plain-
tiff's own conduct contributed to the accident. 
Since those conflicts in evidence, which consti-
tute the very premises for the conclusions as to 
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent, or 
free from negligence, must be resolved by the 
jury, the court could not properly withdraw from 
the jury the determination of such issue." 
In the case of COMPTON V. OGDEN UNION 
RAILWAY & DEPOT CO., No. 7541, issued September 
11, 1951 ______ Utah ______ , ______ P. 2d ______ , the court states : 
"It seems inescapable that the deceased was 
guilty of contributory negligence. It was her duty 
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to look and listen for trains before going on the 
tracks. She had a clear view of the tracks to the 
north, well before she got far enough west to be in 
the path of a train. Under the evidence, the engine 
was there to be seen. If decedent had looked at 
anytime, either as she started, or as she pursued 
a course parallel to, but dangerously near the 
tracks, she must necessarily have seen the train 
approaching. She was, therefore, either negligent 
in failing to look or in failing to heed the train 
if she saw it * * * (citations) * * * We. find no cir-
cumstances of obstructed view or hearing; nor 
where other trains would confuse the deceased as 
existed in the cases of Malizia v. Oregon Shortline 
Ry Co. * * * The trial court was, therefore, cor-
rect in its ruling that she was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law." 
The question in the instant case is whether defend-
ant's car was there to be seen when plaintiff looked. In 
view of the factors of speed, distance, visibility, etc., 
which must be determined before plaintiff can be charged 
with failure to maintain a proper lookout, it is obvious 
that only the jury can make such a determination. 
(b) ASSUMING PLAINTIFF WAS IN SOME MANNER 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
It is the contention of plaintiff that even assuming 
plaintiff was in some manner negligent, such negligence 
could not have been a substantial legal cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. It is plaintiff's contention that this case more 
properly fits in with the doctrine as expressed in HESS 
V. ROBINSON, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510. In this case 
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the driYer of the rar traveling a through strePt, even 
though he should have seen an runbulance, 'vhich accord-
ing to the eYidenre "~as traYeling bet\veen ~5 and 50 miles 
per hour, he could not kno"T it would not stop for the 
stop sign until the ye hicles "Tere so close together that it 
'vould haYe no chance to avoid the collision. 
Also, in the recent case of LOWDER V. HOLLEY, 
______ Utah ______ , 233 P. 2d 350, 351, 352, 353, 355 this court 
through Justice ,, ... ade, stated as follovvs : 
"Reading the record in the light most favor-
able to respondents, as we must do since the trier 
of the facts found in their favor, it appears that 
on ~Iay 30, 1947, Decoration Day, at about 6 :30 
P.~I. Amasa Lowder, one of the respondents here-
in, accompanied by Alene Lowder, his wife, and 
the other respondent herein, and two of their 
small children, was driving his 1937 Pontiac 
sedan westerly along a willow and tree lined 
graveled road running in an east-west direction 
situated in Mapleton, Utah. This road was rough, 
wet, and not very wide and he, therefore, did not 
drive more than twenty miles an hour until he 
approached a place where this road intersected 
with another road running north and south at 
which time he slowed down to approximately 5 to 
10 miles per hour and as he reached the intersec-
tion, Amasa Lowder looked north and south but 
did not observe any cars in either direction. From 
the intersection when Amasa Lowder looked he 
could see up to a house located about 40 rods 
northwest of the intersection but his view of the 
road north beyond the house was obstructed by an 
orchard north of it. Having looked he entered 
the intersection and the rear end of his car had 
passed about three feet beyond the· center line 
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of the traveled portion of the north-south road 
when it was hit on its rear right side by a light 
Terraplane pickup truck being driven south by 
Ruth Holley along the north-south road. The 
north-south road with which the east-west road in-
tersected was also a graveled road and was 54 
feet wide from fence line to fence line. Heavy 
black gouge marks left by the tires of the pickup 
truck in the gravel north of the point of impact 
indicated that Ruth Holley applied her brakes 
about 30 feet before the collision and then after 
the collision her truck had traveled about 75 feet 
across the intersection on the east side going 
south and Amasa Lowder's car was shoved about 
25 feet across the road to the southwest corner of 
the intersection. The officer investigating the 
accident testified that from the physical facts 
disclosed by the marks and tracks on the highway, 
he was of the opinion that the driver of the pick-
up truck was traveling at the rate of about 40 to 
50 miles per hour. Although Ruth Holley testi-
fied that she was only driving at the rate of 30 
miles an hour she admitted that she didn't look 
east of the intersection until she was almost at 
the intersection and then her view was obstructed 
by a pile of dirt and she couldn't see anything. 
She further testified that as soon as she observed 
Amasa Lowder's car in the intersection she ap-
plied her brakes. 
"From what we have outlined abo:ve, although 
there was no evidence that Ruth Holley drove in 
excess of 50 miles per hour, as the court as the 
trier of the facts found, the evidence was clearly 
sufficient for the trier of the facts to reasonably 
find that she was driving at about 50 miles per 
hour and could reasonably find, as it did, that she 
failed to keep a lookout and failed to yield the 
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right of way to .. A.n1asa Low·der's car which was al-
ready in the intersection and had almost reached 
the "~est side of it before her car entered the inter-
section and that this negligence· of Ruth Holley 
'vas the proximate cause of the coJlision. 
''Appellants strenuously argue that respond-
ent Amasa Lowder's contributory negligence pre-
cludes both him and his wife from any recovHry 
for damages and injuries. They argue that he 
failed to look and see Ru,th Holley's truck before 
he entered the intersection and had he looked he 
would have seen the truck and it would have been 
his duty to refrain from entering the intersection 
until he could do so safely. Appellants are cor-
rect in stating that before entering an intersec-
tion the driver of a car must look and determine 
whether it is safe to enter. However, under the 
facts as the court found them, had Amasa Lowder 
observed the truck just before he entered the in-
tersection he would have been justified in con-
sidering it safe to enter because at that point, if 
the truck was being driven at the rate of 50 miles 
per hour, and Amasa Lowder was driving from 5 
to 10 miles per hour, as the trier of the facts could 
reasonably have found, then the truck would have 
been at least 250 feet from the intersection since 
his car had traveled almost the entire distance 
across the intersection before the impact, and this 
being so he could have assumed and acted on the 
assumption that the driver of the truck would 
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in its driv-
ing and that it would be safe to cross the inter-
section. Had Ruth Holley exercised such reason-
able and ordinary care the collision would not 
have occured. Under such a state of facts Amasa 
Lowder's failure to see. the truck could in no way 
have contributed to the accident. The court, there-
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fore, did not err in finding that Amasa Lowder 
was not contributorily negligent." (Italics sup-
plied.) 
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion, states: 
"As the plaintiff approached the intersection, 
he looked in both directions, shifted into second 
gear and proceeded across at 5 to 10 miles per 
hour. Plaintiff had gone about two-thirds of the 
way across the intersection so that the front of 
his car had reached the fence line on the west 
side of the north-south road, upon which defend-
ant was approaching from the north, when plain-
tiff's car was struck in the right rear by defend-
ant's truck. The investigating officer estimated 
that the defendant was traveling between 40 and 
50 miles per hour, basing his opinion upon defend-
ant's skid marks and the damage to both auto-
mobiles. Thus, the defendant was traveling ap-
proximately seven times faster than the plaintiff. 
Evidence concerning the presence of a dirt pile 
and an orchard which affected visibility was con-
sidered by the trial judge, sitting as the fact 
finder. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. 
"I believe the judgment should he affirmed 
because the great disparity in speed between these 
two automobiles places this case in the Hess v. 
Robinson, 109· Utah 60, 163 P. 510 category rather 
than that o£ Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 
350. Although the road defendant was traveling 
is a better road permitting greater speed, there 
was no stop sign at this intersection. Both roads 
are gravel. Whether the plaintiff upon entering 
the intersection should have observed the defe.nd-
ant's car, which could have been some 250 feet 
away, or if upon discovering it plaintiff reason-
ably could have assumed that he had the right of 
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zcay and that the defend ant would slow up to let 
hirn across are all questions of fact. Reasonable 
minds can and certainly do differ in such a situ-
at-ion as this. I cannot say there was error in the 
fact finder's conclusions." 
Had Plaintiff Martin observed the defendant's car 
before he entered the intersection he would have been 
justified in considering it safe to enter. Assuming plain-
tiff was at that time traveling 10 miles per hour plain-
tiff covered some 46 or 50 feet before defendant ran into 
him. From the evidence, the point of impact was in the 
southwest quadrant of the intersection. Assuming de-
fendant was traveling 32 miles per hour, defendant would 
have been at least 150 feet from the intersection. Of 
course, it is obvious that defendant was traveling con-
siderably faster than 32 miles per hour and it is only 
reasonable to assume that defendant was traveling be-
tween 45 to 55 miles per hour. From the facts in evi-
dence a jury could find defendant to have been traveling 
at such a speed. At this rate of speed defendant would 
have been around 250 feet from the intersection. Under 
such a state of facts Plaintiff Martin could have assumed 
and acted on the assumption that the defendant would 
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in his driving and 
that it would be safe to cross the intersection. Had de-
fendant exercised such reasonable and ordinary care the 
collision would not have occurred. Under such a state 
of facts, plaintiff Martin's failure to see defendant could 
in no way have contributed to the accident, therefore, 
the trial court erred in finding Plaintiff Martin contri-
butorily negligent as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion plaintiff apologizes for the numerous 
and sometimes lengthy quotations set forth in his brief. 
However, in view of the past history of cases of this type, 
plaintiff felt it necessary in order to impress upon the 
court the distinctions and differences which they have 
laid down. The trial court in this case caused the plain-
tiff considerable expense when this matter was not sub-
mitted to the jury as it should have been. It is the jury's 
sole prerogative to determine questions of fact where 
reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusions 
reached. Can this court, or the trial court say, under the 
facts as presented, that reasonable minds could not but 
conclude, that Plaintiff Martin was negligent for failing 
to maintain a proper lookout in view of the numerous 
factors which must be determined, such as ; the speed 
defendant was traveling; obstructions and restrictions in 
the field of vision relative to the "blind intersection" 
to the east; distances traveled by the vehicles; whether 
plaintiff fa~led to see what a reasonable observation 
would have revealed; and whether or not plaintiff's fail-
ure to make a reasonable observation was a factor in 
causing the accident. 
It is earnestly contended by plaintiff that the trial 
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court was wrong in its determination and plaintiff has 
been caused serious injury thereby. The judgment of 
the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
l\IcCuLLOUGH, BoYCE & McCuLLOUGH, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
417 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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